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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NBA:
THE ALLOCATION OF DECISION MAKING
AMONG THE COMMISSIONER, IMPARTIAL
ARBITRATOR, SYSTEM ARBITRATOR,
AND THE COURTS
Jeffrey A. Mishkin*
I. INTRODUCrION

Dispute resolution in the NBA is a very fertile topic because the NBA
is no stranger to controversy. The NBA has a long and rich tradition of
endless litigation. Of course, all sports leagues find themselves in great
need of lawyers on an almost continuous basis. This is due in part to the
amount of money in professional sports: players' salaries are extremely
high; television rights are extremely important and lucrative to the sports
leagues; and the Internet has already dramatically changed how leagues
think about their intellectual property rights, such as the brand NBA, the
brand NFL, the brand NHL, and all of the trademark rights that flow
from them.
With the Internet and the ability to sell merchandise and move real
time scores throughout the world, things have changed dramatically,
along with the possibility of interactive television, digital television, and
other technical advances. Sports leagues are concerned with this rapid
expansion of technology and are all trying to protect their intellectual
property in this new environment. Add to these possibilities the fact that
sports leagues now think of themselves as global businesses and are not
limited to either live audiences or television audiences, or even
audiences in the United States. The potential audience is now five billion
people in 250 countries. As a result, the entrance of sports leagues into
the global business arena has a lot to do with why there is such a great
need for lawyers in all the sports leagues and why the NBA has so many
disputes. This speech will focus on dispute resolution in the NBA.

*Jeffrey Mishkin is a member of the New York office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and
Flon Before joining Skadden, Arps, Mr. Mishkin was the chief legal officer of the National
Basketball Association and continues to serve the NBA as its chief outside counsel. While
with the NBA, Mr. Mishkin served as lead litigation counsel in many of the NBA's most
significant cases including NBA v. Willi ams, Chicago Professional Sports and WGN v. NBA,
and NBA v. Motorola.
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II. FORUMS OF NBA DISPUTEs
A. Decisions of the NBA Commissioner
There are any number of different places where the NBA gets to
litigate its disputes. Those forums come from the NBA Constitution,
from the NBA's collective bargaining agreement with the players, the
NBA's collective bargaining agreement with the referees, and from
international arbitration agreements that the NBA has with FIBA (the
International Basketball Federation).
The NBA Constitution is the
governing document that sets forth how the league is going to be
governed, creates the Board of Governors, and establishes the powers of
the Commissioner. One of the powers of the Commissioner is to decide
disputes - any disputes - among NBA teams. That, surprisingly, has not
been a very fertile ground of disputes. There are certainly a lot of
possibilities for disputes among teams in the NBA, but there have not
been very many, so the Commissioner has not had many occasions to
resolve disputes between teams, but it happens.
Where the Commissioner is involved most frequently is in the area
of "tampering." Tampering is where one team approaches a player (or
perhaps a coach) of another team while that player or coach is still under
contract and talks to that player or coach about signing a contract.
Under NBA and all sports leagues rules, it is forbidden for one team to
have contact with the employees of another team while those employees
are still under contract. A recent example concerns Pat Riley when he
had about two years left on his contract with the New York Knicks and
was approached by the Miami Heat. Miami denied approaching him but
somehow contact was made and Riley decided to resign and forego the
last year or so of his contract with the Knicks; a decision he claims had
nothing to do with the contact with the Heat. He then signed with
Miami which led to a claim of tampering by the Knicks against the Heat.
The Riley dispute came to the Commissioner of the NBA. The
Commissioner, acting like an arbitrator, convened a hearing with
witnesses. This hearing was much like a full-blown litigated dispute
between Miami and the Knicks before the Commissioner of the NBA.
Although the matter was ultimately settled, the Pat Riley dispute is an
example of the kind of case that would go to the Commissioner.
As Pat Riley illustrates, coaches are now stars themselves - that is a
fairly new phenomenon. Coaches are commanding contracts that would
previously have been unthinkable. Coaches say they need the respect of
their players, they have to tell players what to do, and when players are
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss2/6
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making $100 million then a coach should really make at least $3 or $4
million. How else will anybody listen to them? Coaches' salaries have
gone up and the notion that coaches are very important has become
more prevalent. Whether in terms of attracting free agents or because
people believe that coaches actually have an impact on winning games
(and some clearly do), the cache that certain coaches bring has led to
more competition among the teams to hold onto and attract coaches and
to pay them in unusual ways. The pay is not limited to just $4 or $5
million a year (which is now not at all uncommon); in the case of Riley,
he received a piece of equity in the team for agreeing to become the
coach. Perhaps that is going to be an area where the Commissioner is
going to have to be more active. But, again, that is hardly the day-to-day
fare of disputes in the NBA.
Much more common, day-to-day litigation occurs under the NBA's
collective bargaining agreement with the Players' Association. This
collective bargaining agreement is a very lengthy document, about 300
pages, and it governs every aspect of the NBA's relationship with the
players. It includes the very elaborate salary cap system in the NBA, the
rules about free agency, how the salary cap works, how the salary cap is
calculated, and a myriad of rules and regulations that are the product of
very difficult negotiations and adversary draftsmanship. A document of
that length and that complexity is simply so fertile with disputes that it is
a cornucopia for lawyers.
The collective bargaining agreement with the Players' Association
has three levels of decision-makers: level one is the Commissioner. The
Commissioner is given authority under the collective bargaining
agreement to decide matters that relate to on-court conduct. For
example, when Dennis Rodman kicked a photographer on the court or
when Mahmud Abdul-Rauf refused to stand for the playing of the
National Anthem, the Commissioner determined those matters because
they involved on-court behavior. The Commissioner has the authority to
impose whatever discipline he considers appropriate for those types of
transgressions and the only appeal permissible under the collective
bargaining agreement is back to the Commissioner himself. It is rare for
the Commissioner to overrule the Commissioner. He has at times at
least given it a second thought and resolutions have been worked out
and the Commissioner might say to a player, "Well, I know I have fined
you $100,000 but if you behave yourself I will give it back to you at the
end of the season." That happens quite a bit.
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Some very important matters have fallen within the Commissioner's
jurisdiction under the collective bargaining agreement. Perhaps the most
important in recent years was when several members of the New York
Knicks left the bench during a very important playoff game against
Miami in 1997. The NBA has a rule that if an altercation breaks out on
the court, no one is permitted to leave the area of the bench, and if any
player leaves the area of the bench, he must be suspended for the next
game. This is a rigid rule. A fight broke out between Charlie Ward of
New York and P.J. Brown of Miami. Miami, either better coached, or
understanding the rules better, or perhaps strapped in by seatbelts,
stayed on the bench. The Knicks' Patrick Ewing and Larry Johnson came
right off the bench - not that they joined the fight - but they certainly
were in the vicinity of the fight and had left the area of the bench. The
Commissioner was faced with the issue of whether or not he should
apply the NBA rule. The rule was clear - you leave the bench and you
are suspended for the next game. However, it had never happened in a
playoff game before, and this was at a point in the playoffs where it
mattered. If the Commissioner suspended Patrick Ewing and some of
the other starting players for the Knicks, it was going to have an impact
on a very important playoff series. The Commissioner concluded that he
had no choice, the rule was clear, the Knicks did what they did, and he
suspended the Knick players. This action very likely cost the Knicks that
playoff round in 1997.
As mentioned earlier, the only appeal of the Commissioner's decision
is to the Commissioner himself. It was pretty clear in this case that there
was no point in coming back to the Commissioner. A lot of time and
deliberation had been spent on making that decision, so coming back to
the Commissioner would simply be a waste of time. But the Players'
Association thought they had another way of dealing with this ruling,
which they thought was unfair. They went to federal court and said that
the Commissioner had exceeded his authority and was violating the
collective bargaining agreement. They concocted some federal claim out
of that and asked for an injunction on the very day the next game was to
be played. A lengthy proceeding was held in front of a federal judge.
The judge denied the injunction on the ground that the collective
bargaining agreement is the product of good faith negotiation and is
clear in that it gives the Commissioner the authority to impose any
penalty that he chooses for on-court behavior, and there is no appeal
from that except to the Commissioner. As a result, the NBA now has a
very clear judicial confirmation of the point that if the issue arises
because of on-court conduct, the Commissioner is the sole authority for
that kind of discipline.
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss2/6
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B. The ImpartialArbitrator
The next level, level two of decision-making under our collective
bargaining agreement with the players, is the impartial arbitrator. A
common feature of collective bargaining agreements is that all disputes
arising under the collective agreement or the uniform player contracts
that were created as part of the collective agreement go to an impartial
arbitrator. But every dispute under the NBA's collective bargaining
agreement does not go to the impartial arbitrator. The arbitrator usually
gets the more routine cases, for example, the cases of alleged nonpayment of obligations under player contracts, or bonuses, clauses
requiring players to maintain a certain weight, et cetera.
Nevertheless, there can be fairly important issues for the impartial
arbitrator such as whether a player has been properly terminated under
a contract. Recently, Rony Seikaly, a former player for the New Jersey
Nets and others brought a proceeding before the impartial arbitrator
claiming that his contract had been improperly terminated by the Nets
because he was injured at the time they terminated him. The Nets
contention was that they had a right under the contract to terminate him
for lack of skill. Rony Seikaly argued that it was not his skill, it was his
injury that made it appear that he had a lack of skill, and the Nets cannot
terminate him because of injury. That dispute was also resolved, but
after about eight to ten days of testimony before the impartial arbitrator.
The impartial arbitrator might hear cases even more important than
Seikaly's. For example, when Latrell Sprewell (before he became the
toast of New York) had choked his coach at Golden State, that was not
on-the-court behavior. That happened in a practice, so it was in a gym
but it was not in the midst of a NBA game, and as a result it did not go to
the Commissioner. At least that was the advice the Commissioner got
from his lawyers, advice he was not entirely happy about. The
Commissioner could, of course, suspend a player for the kind of
behavior Sprewell engaged in and he did - he suspended Sprewell for a
year and in addition to that, the team, the Golden State Warriors,
terminated his contract. But because the incident that gave rise to this
suspension and termination of the contract had not occurred in an NBA
game, the matter could and did go to the impartial arbitrator. The
arbitrator was John Feerick, Dean of the Fordham Law School. This was
a hotly litigated and intensely watched case. There were about nine days
of testimony and newspapers around the country and around the world
followed this case. Overpaid players choking their coaches apparently
hit some chord with the public who asked, "My God, what have we
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2001
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come to?" In any event, that matter was decided by Dean Feerick, in an
exceptionally important decision. Normally, there is little basis to appeal
from an arbitrator's ruling and there probably was not any basis to
appeal from this one.
Dean Feerick reduced the Commissioner's suspension and reinstated
Sprewell's contract, but Sprewell was still not happy with that result and
hired a whole battery of new lawyers who brought an action in federal
court - initially claiming an anti-trust violation in the suspension that
had been imposed. When someone pointed out the deficiencies in that
allegation, it became a race claim that the suspension that Sprewell had
received was larger than would have been imposed on a white player.
The complaint was thrown out twice by the federal district court in San
Francisco, and sanctions were ordered against Sprewells new lawyers.
The matter was appealed to the Ninth Circuit.'
The most significant example of the importance of cases that can
come before the impartial arbitrator was in 1998. At that time the NBA's
old collective bargaining agreement expired and the NBA had the right
to terminate it early and did. Beginning in July 1998, the NBA locked out
the players in support of the NBA's bargaining demands for a new
contract. At the time the NBA locked out the players (July 1998), several
hundred players still had individual contracts in effect. The terms of
those individual contracts extended beyond 1998, so there was a
collective bargaining agreement that was over but there were individual
contracts signed under that collective bargaining agreement that were
not over. Normally, in a lockout there is no issue-the employer does
not pay. That is why you have a lockout-you do not let the employees
come to work, you impose economic hardship on them as well as
yourself. In the caldron of that economic hardship you hope that you
will make a deal.
The players claimed (and this matter went before the impartial
arbitrator because it was a contract dispute) that they were entitled to be
paid under their contracts. If the NBA was voluntarily locking its doors,
that was up to the NBA; but, the players had existing contracts calling
for salaries in total of about $850 million for one year. Dean Feerick got
the question of whether the NBA (there was no issue of the propriety of
locking out, he was not deciding that), despite the lockout, would have
to pay these individual contracts.
1 The district court's decision was eventually affirmed.

Warriors, 231 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2000).
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That issue was monumental. It asked the question whether the NBA
was going to have any labor law remedies. So there were a lot of chips
on the table. Dean Feerick held that the NBA did not have to pay the
individual contracts and that they were all subsidiary to the collective
agreement. Once the collective agreement was over, these contracts were
at least suspended - if not terminated. Dean Feerick did not make a
precise determination of the status of the contracts other than to say that
the NBA was permitted to lockout and these individual contracts did not
constitute any waiver by the NBA of its right to lockout and withhold
payment from the players. So the lockout continued and the players
were not paid. An agreement was reached several months later after a
lot of damage to the game, to the players, and to the league. But some
very important changes were made in the salary cap system. Again, that
all came from the impartial arbitrator who normally only gets the routine
cases. But there are some mornings that the impartial arbitrator wakes
up and he is deciding the entire fate of the league. So, it is quite a varied
docket that the impartial arbitrator has.
C. The System Arbitrator
Level three of dispute resolution under our collective bargaining
agreement is what is called the system arbitrator. This is the arbitrator
who is supposed to get the important cases. He is called the system
arbitrator because the questions he gets are those that relate to the
overall economic system that was put in place in the collective
bargaining agreement, including anything about how the salary cap
operates and is calculated. There have been some hotly contested issues
about the way the salary cap is calculated. Calculation of the salary cap
begins with a concept called "basketball related income." Basketball
related income is all the income that comes into the league and its teams.
A percentage of basketball related income then forms the basis of the
salary cap. But what is included and not included in basketball related
income can have a huge impact on how high the cap is in any particular
year. Disputes arise, for example, over naming rights, which were not
dealt with specifically in the collective agreement. Were they in
basketball related income or not? Hundreds of millions of dollars turned
on that question. That is the kind of issue that the system arbitrator
would get.
The system arbitrator also gets the issues of whether or not the salary
cap is being circumvented and whether teams, players, and agents are
cheating under the cap rules. As of November 3, 2000, the NBA was
trying the Joe Smith case before the system arbitrator and the issue there
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Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 [2001], Art. 6

456

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35

was (for the first time ever) that the NBA discovered a written
agreement. This secret written agreement between player and team, Joe
Smith and the Minnesota Timberwolves, was a complete and
unbelievable violation of the salary cap. It provided for a series of five
contracts that would be signed into the future. It made Joe Smith a
"Larry Bird" player, which allows a player to sign for any amount up to
the individual maximums with your own team. A player has to be with
the team for three years to do that. Joe Smith was signing with
Minnesota in 1999 as a free agent - he was not entitled to Bird rights, he
would have to play for three years for Minnesota to achieve that status.
But this secret deal provided for a series of three one-year contracts and
then two other contracts going out to 2008 promising him $84 million.
All of that violated so many salary cap rules I cannot list them. The NBA
uncovered that agreement. It does not appear that there is much to
litigate once you have that agreement in hand.
In the past, the NBA has alleged that there were undisclosed
agreements between players and teams that violated the salary cap - that
players were accepting one year contracts with teams for a lot less
money than other teams were offering and no one could understand
why that was happening. But it was understandable if you believe that
the team offering the lesser amount of money, legal under the salary cap,
for the one year contract had promised the player, "don't worry - when
you become a 'Bird' player, we'll take care of you and this is what you
are going to get. Whatever you gave up with the other teams, we'll
make that up and more." How prevalent that is cannot be determined.
The NBA believes that it has happened in a number of cases and is asked
for by agents routinely. How many teams succumb cannot be known,
but some do. Prior to Joe Smith, the NBA had never seen a written
contract of this scope and this brazenness.
But even when the NBA had the smoking gun in hand, there were
still issues to litigate before the system arbitrator because one of the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement is that upon a finding
of an undisclosed agreement-a finding by a system arbitrator that there
was an undisclosed agreement-the Commissioner then has the
authority to void any player contract between the team and the player
found to have violated the salary cap. The first issue that came up
several weeks ago was "well, this is very bad, this secret agreement. We
are putting that aside. But Joe Smith would like to sign with Minnesota
again." The Commissioner said, "I am going to void any contract that
you sign with him again, certainly for this coming year. That would just
be effectuating the secret agreement and we are not going to do that."
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol35/iss2/6

Mishkin: Dispute Resolution in the NBA: The Allocation of Decision Making

20011

ADR IN THE NBA

457

So the players brought a claim to the system arbitrator saying that the
Commissioner's power to void any contract could not extend to future
contracts, contracts that had not yet been entered into. Litigation over
this issue took place before the system arbitrator. He came to a
reasonably sensible conclusion that if the new contract is the product of
circumvention and is a product of the secret agreement, it can be voided
by the Commissioner. Put another way, unless the new contract is so
starkly different from what the secret agreement contemplated, then the
Commissioner can void even a future contract. But there would have to
be a factual hearing over whether it was really the product of
circumvention or whether it was starkly different, which is why so much
litigation took place. (Smith eventually signed with Detroit).
The secret agreement was signed in 1999, and Smith had already
played under two contracts under that secret agreement before the NBA
discovered it, the one year agreement that covered '98-'99, and the
second one year agreement covering '99-2000.
As part of the
Commissioner's penalties that he imposed here (which involved a fine of
$3.5 million and the forfeiture of five draft picks), he also voided every
player contract that was referred to in the secret agreement, including
the two that had already been performed. The significance of those two
contracts is (as previously mentioned) that in order to become a 'Bird'
player (to be able to get a really big contract unrestrained by the salary
cap, except for the individual maximum) you need to be with a team for
three years. Joe Smith wanted credit for those two years played under
those two contracts that had been the product of the secret agreement.
Essentially, the NBA said, "You've got to be kidding! The Commissioner
has voided those contacts. Those contracts were illegal. They never
should have come into being. And so no, you don't get your 'Bird'
rights." And the player said, "Oh, that is wrong. The player is entitled
to his 'Bird' rights just because he actually played. He physically played
for those two years so it doesn't matter. The Commissioner cannot void
contracts that have already been fully performed." This presented an
interesting question. The NBA spent the entire day November 3, 2000
with witnesses and with legal argument debating whether or not the
Commissioner's power to void any contract extended to voiding past
contracts that had now been fully performed but were being invoked as
the basis for the player getting his 'Bird' rights. So that is the second
Smith proceeding that the NBA has had in these otherwise clear
circumstances and it probably is not the last.
And the NBA had yet a fourth issue that has been tendered by
Minnesota, which is that the penalty was too high. Five draft picks was
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too high because the Commissioner really had made a settlement
agreement to take away fewer draft picks than that and the
Commissioner has reneged on the settlement. But, once again, the
complexity of this agreement will lead to litigation after litigation after
litigation and that is the type of litigation that the system arbitrator gets
to hear.
m.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

In conclusion, I would like to discuss the NBA's participation in
international markets. Apart from the NBA's collective agreement with
the players, the NBA has an international component to its business. The
NBA, to some extent, is in competition with basketball leagues and
teams around the world for the services of players. A number of
countries have very well developed professional basketball leagues, for
example Italy, Spain, Greece, Yugoslavia, Germany, and a number of
other countries.
These countries are producing some very good
basketball players. Every once in a while players (maybe a couple a
year) will be attractive enough to NBA teams that they would like to
have that player. Most of those players (in order to have gotten good
enough to reach the NBA's radar screen) have played for some
professional team, usually in Europe, and already have a contract. So the
NBA (as much as they might want to sign a foreign player) is often
confronted with a contract (or an alleged contract) that player has with a
team in one of these countries. Often when one of these countries hears
that the NBA might be interested in its player their reaction is: "Well, of
'course, we have a contract. It's been in the draw for six years but yes,
there it is and we will be happy to get rid of this contract but you will
have to pay us a lot of money." Those sorts of disputes existed and the
NBA did not quite know how to handle them because there are 200 or
more countries in which basketball is played and in which there are
basketball federations and legal systems that greatly differ from our
own.
When a dispute like that arose where was it going to get heard? It is
going to be a race to the courthouse. Was the NBA going to be dealing
with the police court in Seville over whether or not a player could have a
contract that prevented him from playing in the NBA? Or would the
NBA team win the race and find a friendly judge in its home town? This
process seemed to be unseemly and not a very good way to deal with the
problem that was becoming more and more of an issue. In response to
this problem, ten years ago the NBA entered into a contract with FIBA
(the International Basketball Federation) and set up an international
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arbitration system so that now if an NBA team wishes to sign a player
who last played for a FIBA team somewhere outside of the United States,
the NBA must ask FIBA for clearance. Is that player free of any
contractual obligations? Can he play for an NBA team? And if FIBA
says, "No he is not," then the NBA has the right to dispute that
determination and bring it to the international arbitrator. That has
happened with increasing frequency over the last number of years.
The NBA still had to find a neutral location. FIBA would not agree
to come to the United States and the NBA would not agree to go to
Switzerland (although that would probably have been okay but the NBA
would not agree to go to Spain or Italy). The international arbitrator sits
in London and the process was formed with the intent of making the
international arbitration expensive and cumbersome so that people
would settle and not use the system. But the NBA agreed on London
because Great Britain has very little professional basketball and counsel
for the NBA would understand the language.
A year ago, the NBA had a case that went the entire route through a
litigated conclusion before the international arbitrator in London
involving a player named Aleksandar Radojevic. He played for a team
called Beduchnost in Montenegro. The NBA had Croatian law experts
and it was an interesting and hotly contested matter before the
international arbitrator.
A more recent case involved a player named Iakovos Tsakalidis, the
starting center on the Greek national team who had led the Greek team
to some prominence over the last year or two. He was drafted this past
year by the Phoenix Suns, but his team in Greece (known as "AEK")
claimed he could not sign a contract with Phoenix because he had a
contract with them. The agent for Tsakalidis told the NBA that contract
was not valid, so the NBA began to look into it. Low and behold, the
NBA discovered that lakovos Tsakalidis was really not the player's name
at all, his name was Alexi Ledkov, and he was from Russia. He was not
Greek, he was Russian. He had been discovered in Stavropol, Russia, by
a Greek agent and he had been brought to Athens, where he was
miraculously converted into lakovos Tsakalidis. This was all contrary to
FIBA's rules about how many foreign nationals you could have on a
team. The NBA also discovered that the contract that they were relying
on (signed when he was eighteen) had been presented to him only in
Greek. As a Russian he was having some difficulty deciphering his
contract. But the agent who had found him in Russia said, "Oh it's fine.
The contract is just fine, sign here Iakovos and everything will be okay."
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And Jake (as we call him) signed and he thought he was signing a four
year deal. That was four years ago and the NBA thought he was free to
be drafted and signed with Phoenix. But when this Greek contract was
translated, it was not a four year contract. It had a four year initial term
but then it had an option in the team to renew it for five more years and
after the five years were over, if Tsakalidis did not sign yet another
contract with this team, he would have to repay his last two years of
salary. This was a contract that was never going to end. This provided a
lot of good ground for cross-examination and many interesting
proceedings in London.
These players always seem much more attractive to the team when
the foreign team is claiming they cannot have him. As soon as they get
the player he suddenly becomes less indispensable; he is a "project," and
teams wonder why they bothered with all this. Aleksandar Radojevic is
somewhere on Toronto's injured list and Tsakalidis (they traded Luc
Longley right in the middle of this hearing, putting even more pressure
on their lawyers because they would have had no center if the NBA lost
this case) is actually playing for Phoenix, but we will see how long that
lasts.
IV. CONCLUSION

As you can see, the NBA's increasing interest in international
markets and players will present challenges as well as opportunities in
the future. Certainly, the number of international players coming to the
NBA and WNBA will continue and even accelerate. To address these
new challenges, the NBA made great progress with the FIBA agreement.
What the European countries are realizing through these proceedings is
that if you want to have a contract that sticks, it better not be one-sided
or unfair. Hopefully, the FIBA agreement will serve as a model for
future NBA dealings with foreign players.
On the domestic front, with increasing salaries for both players and
coaches, the NBA will continue to be no stranger to controversy. The
NBA's long and rich tradition of litigation is in no jeopardy of ending.
Luckily, the system of arbitration in the NBA - between the
Commissioner, impartial arbitrators, and system arbitrators - is a sturdy
system that will work to resolve these conflicts. I hope this speech was
helpful in understanding how we deal with disputes in the NBA - both
here at home and abroad.
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